2014 Learjet CFIT rainstorm Bahamas
The chartered Learjet carrying VIP passengers hit obstacles and crashed following a second ILS approach in bad weather, including heavy rain showers immediately prior to the accident which killed all the occupants. The investigation was hampered by lack of a Flight Data Recorder and non-provision of information by the operator. The report does not include a CVR transcript but the investigation made use of it.
The 2 pilots were the only employees and flew approximately 100 hrs per annum on the operator's only aircraft. The Captain PF was very a experienced pilot, the F/O relatively inexperienced (1000 hrs total). The crew had had no CRM training. The report indicates that the crew were under pressure to deliver their VIP passengers. The flight was conducted in an irresponsible manner, not following IFR procedures, giving misleading position reports and deliberately disabling the GPWS. The weather included variable cloudbase and visibility between 4 and 1 mile with rain.
No briefings were recorded and the first approach was unstable: several Terrain Awareness Warning System (TAWS) alerts were heard but ignored. The tower noted the aircraft was in sight and cleared it to land, but it went around, due to not having the runway on sight, and with the crew being unsure of courses and altitudes required. During the second approach about 15 minutes later, the Captain apparently ignored the ILS glideslope and made step-down descents to 1000ft, then 400ft and 300ft over the water, ignoring several more TAWS alerts before the system was disabled.
The Captain repeatedly asked the F/O to look for the runway before the aircraft struck a crane on the runway centreline at 200 ft above field elevation, 3 miles short of the runway, and shortly after the F/O called out "climb, climb".
Given this crew's willful disregard of many other SOPs it is questionable whether any changed SOP would have been followed, but it can be said that if they had been trained to use a PicMA procedure,
1) it is likely that some briefings including missed approach procedure would have been performed;
2) it is less likely that the ILS approaches and the first go-around would have been flown in the manner they were, and
3) given that the aircraft was in sight from the tower at the time of the first go-around, it is likely that the Captain would have had sufficient visual reference to have landed from the first approach, removing the need for a second under commercial pressure to get in at all costs.
