2010 B737 CFTT Asahikawa Japan
The B737-800 was cleared to descend whilst being vectored towards mountainous terrain. After a lack of coordination in the ATC centre following a runway change, it received an initial GPWS alert. The crew reacted with a minimum altitude of 6500 ft but not sufficiently to prevent a second alert. The aircraft missed the 7200ft peak on their track by about 650 ft. but was recovered to land without further incident.
The CVR record was not available for full analysis.
The newly promoted Captain was younger and much less experienced in both total hours and on type than the F/O. Both pilots were uneasy about the vectoring in high terrain, but did neither communicated any concern to the other. When the first GPWS alert occurred the Captain did not follow through the entire escape manoeuvre.
Although the crew members had received CRM training, this had not been effective. In particular, the report noted the FO's stated belief that FOs should play their part in a modest manner without violating each other’s turf in the cockpit and that the important decisions are left to the PIC, and he did not provide appropriate advice for the PIC even in the serious incident. Neither the PIC nor the FO openly stated their views or talked about their situation with each other. This mental attitude is not compatible with the philosophy sought in the CRM. It is probable that what the PIC and the FO had received in their CRM training was not practiced in the actual situation."
Although by many standards the authority gradient in this serious incident was very flat, it is possible that cultural factors led to the excessive respect for rank and "in-charge factor" that prevented the FO from monitoring effectively.
It was also clear that the Captain's concerns were not adequately conveyed to ATC as they were mitigated by the need to communicate them via the F/O. The report noted that "It is probable that the ground proximity occurred because: an air controller instructed the aircraft to descend below the MVA without confirming it; its flight crew did not question the Radar Controller on the descent instruction in spite of awareness of being vectored to the east toward the mountainous area."
If PicMA had been the SOP, the FO wouldm have been flying the aircraft and the Captain operating the radio. It is more likely that
1) there would have been more discussion of the high terrain prior to starting the approach
2) the Captain would have expressed his concern about the clearances directly to ATC
3) in the event of the FO flying the aircraft on a clearance whose safety was questionable, the Captain would have acted positively to intervene, and not been as inhibited in monitoring.
