The report shows large numbers of systemic failures in many areas of the operation, culminating in a tired and under-trained crew carrying out a number of approaches. The report should make salutary reading for regulators but these comments are confined to the impact of operational procedures.

Although the operator's manuals contained instructions that a "PicMA" procedure should be used in these circumstances on some types, the crew appeared unaware of it. Both Captain and F/O were inexperienced and under-trained for their role, should not have been paired together and were probably fatigued. 

The flight was operated with the F/O as PF throughout. Approaches were made with RVR below minima. On each approach the Captain as PM called for the approach to be continued as an automated "minimums" call-out was made. The Captain also elected to operate the power levers instead of the PF as was required by normal procedures.  

If the flight had been conducted using PicMA procedures as per the company's policy on other fleets, some of the many other failings and contributory factors to this accident might have been mitigated,  As it was, the Captain appeared to be focused on getting the aircraft onto the ground and had little concept pf CRM, due to the lack of training and checking he had been given.