In this accident the crew had been trained for, and would have used, a PicMA procedure if the reported weather had reflected the actual weather. The fact that they did not was due to the Captain having the option to choose not to do so. The operator's policies were not "fail-safe" in that they did not address the possibility that reported weather would not match that encountered by their crews.  

This accident has some similar characteristics to an earlier one with the same operator, following which it raised its mandatory criteria for PicMA use from "300 ft / 1 mile" to "1000 ft / 3 miles" - but only for non-precision approaches.  If the procedure had been the "default" SOP, the event would likely not have occurred. 

The official report states "The captain elected to carry out a manual pilot-flown-approach and not a pilot-monitored approach. This decision was based on the fact that the reported weather was above the mandatory PMA weather limits identified in the Cargojet SOPs. When the aircraft encountered heavy rain just moments before reaching the decision height, it is likely that both pilots’ attention was focused primarily on the runway. This likely caused the excessive airspeed to go undetected. The decision to carry out a pilot-flown-approach, rather than a pilot-monitored approach, at night, in heavy rain, likely contributed to the aircraft’s higher than required airspeed that was maintained until touchdown." 

If a PicMA had been in use, it is likely that

1) the excessive approach speed would have been corrected earlier; 

2) if it had built up after the PiC had assumed control when visual, the copilot would have been monitoring the  instruments more closely and been able to bring it to the PiC's attention.