Both pilots were reasonably experienced. The F/O as PM subsequently stated that he would have liked the Captain to have gone around to allow more time to complete the QRH items, which went unconfirmed by the Captain as PF. As a result the Captain was had not refreshed his knowledge of the systems affected by the loss of the A hydraulics, which significantly affected deceleration and directional control - brakes, reversers, spoilers, rudder and nose wheel steering. 

If the crew had been using a PicMA procedure, it would have fallen to the Captain as PM during the approach to action the QRH, which involved only 2 immediate actions. However it would have been followed by reading the list of affected systems. At that stage of the flight it is likely he would have called for a go-around (as was in fact desired by the F/O), while the crew analysed the consequences of the hydraulic loss.

As it was, having indicated that he had already seen the runway, his plan continuation bias towards landing resulted in a fast shallow touchdown, completely unprepared for the reduced control that he was then faced with.