The report lacks significant information including a CVR transcript. It appears that the First Officer was PF; both piolots were from the same European country and relatively experienced. The approach was mis-handled and unstable.

The report states that "The cloud was low; the Captain said in his statement that the cloud base was about 100ft above minimum. Speci weather was also available to the crew. The pilot was advised to exercise caution due to the rain and the weather at that time. In spite of all the warnings the co-pilot was still allowed to proceed with the landing. At the point of touch down the captain observed that it was impossible to stop on the runway and he called for a go-around."

The actual weather report around the time landing was visibility 600m sky obscured in heavy rain, with wind gusting 30 to 45 kts.  

The aircraft was apparently flying at Vref+50kts at the threshold and Vref+30 at touchdown. The Captain attempted to go-around after touchdown and initial thrust reverser deployment but this was over-ridden by the F/O's re-closure of the thrust levers and re-selection of reversers. 

The report noted failures in organisational management by the airline and  inconsistencies in the crew statements compared to the available data traces. It was most highly critical of the Captain's failure to exercise his command authority in allowing the F/O to continue the approach and landing in the severe weather.

In the absence of more detailed information it is difficult to assess what difference a revised crew procedure might have made, but there appears to be evidence that the F/O was allowed to conduct the flight as he saw fit with no effective supervision by the Captain ("in charge" factor).  The report noted that there was no effective CRM displayed by the crew.