The report noted numerous factors in this accident, including degraded aircraft performance due to ice accretion, anomalies in operational regulations and certification, inadequacies in guidance regarding go-around and many others. The vertical visibility was only 100 ft, and conditions were effectively "Cat 2"  but the crew were not required to treat it as such, and other protections such as runway lighting normally associated with these conditions were absent, and the judgment of the Captain in allowing the relatively inexperienced F/O to conduct the landing in these conditions was questioned.

However only aspects relevant to crew procedures are commented on here. 

The Captain as PM acquired some visual cues just at DH, causing the F/O as PF to go head-up. The PF not not complete his assessment of the cues to confirm landing until 35ft below the (Cat 1) DH, and immediately disconnected the autopilot .     

The report specifically compares the "traditional" procedure used by Air Canada with the PiCMA procedure and notes that the latter results in lower workload and  that "When weather conditions are at or above approach limits, using PMA techniques provides the landing pilot with more time to assess whether the landing can be made and to better visually determine the position of the aircraft relative to the desired profile."  

It went on examine weather-related accidents and incidents in Canada. "A review of the occurrences in Canada showed that the main reason for many of them was the lack of adequate visual references, firstly, to give pilots a clear understanding of where the aircraft was relative to the desired profile and, secondly, to allow pilots to maintain or correct to that profile".

It further noted that "Two Canadian airlines that use the PMA techniques did not have any reported visibility-related landing occurrences even though one of the airlines has high rates of exposure to low-weather approaches".  

If the crew had been using a PiCMA procedure, it is likely that the F/O would have started his assessment of the visual cues significantly earlier, and been expected to announce his decision at DH.  As it appears that these had only just became visible, a go-around on instruments is more likely to have occurred.    

If he had elected to land, the Captain would have been expected to maintain much closer monitoring of the instruments below DH which would perhaps have resulted in earlier detection of the flight path deviations and an earlier call for a go around.

However in reality it is unlikely that in fact the Captain would have been unable to resist the urge to check the F/O's landing by visual cues, with the same outcome. This aspect is covered on this site in the section on "First Officers' Flying" and in particular First Officers Minima.